July
4, 2015 //
Prepared by
Odeen Ishmael
BACKGROUND
1. Guyana, as
a sovereign state, rejects all forms of foreign aggression, subjugation,
occupation, domination, dependence, or hegemonistic tendencies, and equally
resents interference and pressures (of whatever kind) which impinge on its
international relationships.
2. In view of
Venezuela’s claim to western Essequibo, the highest priority should always be
given to the consideration and formulation of Guyana’s strategy and tactics for
the preservation of its territorial integrity. This priority should remain for
as long as this claim is not aborted.
3.
Previously, between 1966 and 1982, Venezuela was guilty of the following
unfriendly and hostile acts:
A. Those of a
military nature
(i) In 1966
Venezuelan diplomatic personnel in Guyana were engaged in a clandestine attempt
to interfere in the internal affairs of Guyana through the subversion of
members of Guyana’s Amerindian community. As a result, Guyana was forced to
declare as persona non grata a Second Secretary of the Venezuelan Embassy in Georgetown.
(ii) In 1966,
(a few months after Guyana’s independence, and even while Guyana was discussing
the modalities for resolving the controversy), Venezuela militarily occupied
the Guyana part of an island of Ankoko, through which the common border runs,
and has remained in occupation of it to this very day.
(iii) In 1968
the then President of Venezuela issued a decree which purported to annex a belt
of sea off the coast of Essequibo as part of its territorial waters and
contiguous zone of Venezuela. That decree authorised the armed forces of
Venezuela to impose dominion over the belt of sea which is part of Guyana’s
sovereign territory. This decree, considered by Guyana to be a calculated
breach of Article 5(2) of the Geneva Agreement, violated the established tenets
of international law and practice.
(iv)
Thereafter, Venezuela has committed numerous acts of aggression in violation of
Guyana’s territorial integrity, and routinely violated Guyana’s air space. It
also posted jungle brigades at the border to create tension and intimidation.
(v) In late 1968, a number of Guyanese citizens residing in the Rupununi received military training in Venezuela. They later launched a military attack on police outposts in the Rupununi with an aim of dismembering the state of Guyana. The uprising was put down by the Guyana Defence Force and the leaders of the armed rebels fled to Venezuela where they were granted asylum.
(B) Those of
an economic nature
(i) In 1968,
Venezuela conducted a campaign to hurt Guyana economically. It inserted a paid
advertisement in the British newspaper, the Times, to deter would be investors
from considering investments within the area claimed by Venezuela. This was
obviously intended to undermine Guyana’s efforts to attract investment in the area.
(ii) In June
1981, the Foreign Minister of Venezuela wrote to the President of the World
Bank expressing Venezuela’s opposition to the construction of a hydro-electric
facility in Mazaruni. Its objection to this project, which was assessed as
economically and technically feasible, was on the grounds that it was in the
region of Guyana which Venezuela claims. This was obviously another calculated
act of economic aggression.
(iii) Early
in 1982 the Venezuelan Government approached the European Economic Community in
an effort to dissuade that body from participating in Guyana’s development.
(C) Those of
a political nature
(i) Just
after Guyana became independent, Venezuela’s deliberate intervention invoked a
specific Article in the Charter of the Organisation of American States (OAS) to
prevent Guyana becoming a member as long as Venezuela maintained a claim to
territory in Guyana.
(ii) At the
11th General Assembly of the OAS held in St. Lucia in December 1981, Venezuela
frustrated all constructive efforts to find a formula for the elimination of
this discriminatory Article. Venezuela eventually agreed to the amendment of
the Charter in 1990 thus allowing both Guyana and Belize to become permanent
members of the OAS in 1991.
(iii) A
provision similarly discriminating against Guyana and Belize also existed in
the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin
America, aimed at making Latin America a nuclear weapons free zone. This
provision was amended to coincide with that to the OAS Charter. Before this
amendment, Guyana and Belize were excluded from the treaty on the basis that
their territories were being claimed by other countries. This discriminatory
Article in the treaty was previously firmly supported by Venezuela.
(iv) In the
wider international field Guyana attached great importance to the issue of
“intervention and interference in the internal affairs of states.” This matter
was raised at the Colombo Non-Aligned summit in 1976 as part of a general
strategy to combat the destabilisation of small non aligned and other
developing states. Despite more than 5 years of patient effort and hard work,
the UN General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session failed to adopt a
declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention and interference in the
internal affairs of states. Unfortunately Venezuela was the only developing
country which sided with those who voted against the adoption of the
declaration.
(v) Since
1982, political aggression from Venezuela has been mainly in the form of
re-statements by leaders of the Venezuelan government of claims to Guyana’s
territory. Some of these statements have also been seen as warnings and threats
to foreign investors in western Essequibo. Venezuela has erroneously maintained
that under Article 5(2) of the Geneva Agreement, Guyana does not have the right
to grant concessions in western Essequibo to investors. This economic
aggression on the part of Venezuela has no doubt prevented some foreign
investment in the area. For example, a Chinese firm which was granted lumbering
concessions in Essequibo in 2000, decided not to continue with its planned
investment after the Venezuelan government stated its objection to the Chinese
government. In addition, an agreement for a considerable investment of hundreds
of millions of US dollars by Beal Aerospace of Texas to set up a satellite
launching station on the north coast of the Essequibo region faced strong
opposition by Venezuela. The project was aborted in 2000 on the grounds that
the planned project was no longer economically feasible. However, it was also
clear that political pressure was exerted on the company by the Venezuelan
government.
(vi) From
2004 to 2014, political and economic cooperation improved between the two
countries especially with the Venezuelan decision not to object to most foreign
investments in western Essequibo, the implementation of the Petro-Caribe
agreement and the sale of Guyana’s rice to Venezuela. In the period of the
Chavez presidency, the territorial claim was downplayed by Venezuela and
emphasis was placed on closer cooperation activities with Guyana.
(vii)
Venezuela’s military has also from time to time intruded into Guyana’s
territorial and air and maritime space, and at least on one occasion a
Venezuelan military unit enter Guyana’s territory and destroyed Guyanese mining
property and equipment. Also, in another intrusion, a Guyanese man was shot
dead.
(viii) More
recently, in 2013, a seismic survey ship contracted by Guyana was seized by the
Venezuelan navy in Guyana’s waters in the Atlantic Ocean and held under arrest
in Venezuela.
(ix) Then in
March 2015, Venezuela objected to an Exxon-Mobil oil rig drilling in Guyana’s
continental shelf and making a frivolous claim to Guyana’s maritime space. And
soon after Exxon-Mobil announced that it discovered a presence of huge
quantities of hydrocarbon resources, the Venezuelan president issued a decree
claiming sovereignty over almost all of Guyana’s continental shelf.
ASSESSMENT OF
SUPPORT
4. Boundary
disputes between nations tend to be long and bitter. Boundaries change through
diplomatic, adjudicative or international institutional procedures or use of
armed force. Solutions through peaceful means take time to be accepted and it
is still a hope that settlements, once arrived at, are permanent and final. The
present case is illustrative of the problem of settlement of international
disputes. For nearly sixty years, in the nineteenth century, Britain and
Venezuela wrangled over what was then referred to as the Anglo Venezuelan
boundary dispute. The arbitration settlement reached in 1899 lasted just over
another sixty years when the present controversy arose.
5. Guyana’s
position on the controversy arising out of the Venezuelan claim has been based
entirely on the legal documentation pertaining to the issue, most importantly
upon the award of the arbitration tribunal of 1899. Since the Protocol of Port
of Spain lapsed in 1982, the Guyana government put into effect a concerted
programme of action in order to provide an effective counter to Venezuelan
multifaceted aggression. Its aim was to enlighten the domestic and
international community as to the reality of the situation. In this regard, the
government was able to mobilise public opinion at home by way of the media and
by public meetings. At the international level, Guyana’s position has received
strong statements of support from the Commonwealth Heads of Government, the
Caricom group of countries, and from other friendly countries on an individual
basis.
6. Yet there
are certain realities which pertain to the support which Guyana’s position has
attracted. Despite the numerical size of the Commonwealth and Caricom groups,
the response by those member states has been based upon the legal and moral
principles related to the Venezuelan claim. It would seem as though there
exists another perspective in other quarters, and that perspective is largely
informed by the nuances of the issue in a hemispheric context.
7. Within the
Caribbean, Caricom countries are already supportive and the group’s resolutions
prescribe collective support on issues of territorial integrity, despite the
reservations and perceived domestic constraints of some member states. The
Canadian position is synonymous with that of the Commonwealth. In effect, that
leaves the Latin American countries and, of course, the United States of
America, the central figure in terms of the application of pressure within the
hemisphere.
PRESERVING
GUYANA’S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
8. The
preservation of Guyana’s territorial integrity is, and will continue to be,
central to the conduct of our foreign policy. Moreover, the territorial claims
of Venezuela, in addition to that of Suriname, give a real determination in the
evolution of that foreign policy. The strategy, therefore, is clear and
unchanging — the maintenance of the land area acquired at independence. The
supporting tactics then have to take account of the prevailing and changing
circumstances. In the past, these have been substantially influenced by the
degree of activation of the respective territorial claims from the two
neighbouring claimants. Thus the initiatives have been less activist than
responsive.
9. The
controversy arising out of the Venezuelan claims must not be regarded as a
“dispute” since Guyana recognizes that the 1899 award gave a full, perfect and
final settlement to the border dispute which existed up to that time. This
full, perfect and final settlement of the arbitral award of 1899, accepted by
all the parties, is now challenged by one. From the Guyana perspective, there
is no dispute. Moreover, while there are no Guyanese counter-claims, Guyana
appreciates that the historical evidence cannot rule out such claims in the
future. Secondly, Guyana does not recognize any claim to its territory by
Venezuela, but only agrees, according to the Geneva Agreement, that a
controversy exists over the Venezuelan contention of the nullity of the award.
10. The
physical military disparities with Venezuela have been quite evident. This
military preponderance of Venezuela, in addition to what appeared as a
resource-rich economy, has posed a real threat to Guyana’s territorial
integrity.
11. Guyana’s
economic problems put pressures on the expansion of its military. Despite this,
Guyana’s demonstrated efforts to contain, or to neutralise the Venezuelan
claims and threats, through its diplomatic achievement internationally, have
been recognised. This diplomatic accomplishment ought not to lead Guyana to
seek as a continuing tactic to “talk out” the so-called dispute, even though
diplomacy may be the art of postponing decisions so as to avoid action. Some
leading diplomats in the pre-1992 period were of the view that, as was the case
of the Protocol of Port of Spain, Guyana should promote a breathing space, as
opposed to the ultimate —a definitive settlement in the near future.
12.
Sustaining a diplomatic exercise exclusive to the boundary issue appears, in
present circumstances, to be more to Venezuela’s advantage. Guyana must get
back to the frontal and bilateral approach. The reasons for rejecting
“negotiation” on the issue in the context of the Geneva Agreement should not be
extended to “negotiation” as a means in the wider bilateral relationship. In
actual fact, Venezuelan acts of political and economic aggression set in motion
the balkanisation of Guyana threatening to sever its territorial compactness.
In another thirty years or so, should Venezuela maintain this political and
economic action, the centrifugal tendencies would be much stronger. Such
tendencies will continue to hamper rapid economic progress in the western
Essequibo, which is seen as one of the main objectives of Guyana’s western
neighbour. Thus, to put undue pressure on Guyana, Venezuela , really, has no
cause to reach any agreement on the boundary issue.
REFERRAL TO
UN SECRETARY GENERAL
13. Both
Guyana and Venezuela have accepted a referral of the issue to the UN Secretary
General of the United Nations, as dictated by Article 4(2) of the Geneva
Agreement. By doing so, an equally interminable diplomatic process was opened.
The Secretary General initiated the Good Offices process twenty-five years ago
but this, to date, has not advanced the process of reaching a solution. The
Secretary General, it can be assumed, at some indeterminable time, can proceed
to recommend one or another of the means of pacific settlement prescribed in
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter. He will do so until agreement or
exhaustion of the means has been reached. It is likely that he will exclude
initially the two means upon which disagreement has already been conceded:
negotiation and judicial settlement, and may well begin by recommending
“enquiry.” For the sake of argument, if the means of enquiry were accepted,
implementation can well run into years before resolution or failure is reached.
The parties may than be exhorted to move on to, say, mediation, which will open
another long winded process. What then happens should all the means for pacific
settlement fail to provide a solution? What should Guyana do to prevent this
systematic erosion of its territorial integrity through even a sincere
conformity with the Geneva Agreement? Guyana has to recognize that, on the one
hand, it may not be exposed to a decisive and surgical disintegration of
Guyana’s territorial unity through military action. On the other hand, the
country may face an equally lethal process of disintegration through calculated
encroachments into its territorial fabric and inducements to the people in the
area and beyond. If Venezuelan politicians are shrewd enough, and there is no
reason to be complacent about them, this is as viable an option to pursue and
thus avoiding the grave risks of international censure for military escapade.
14. The means
for pursuing such an option can vary considerably. They will obviously follow
the traditional pattern of diplomatic and, in particular, cultural, educational
and social exchange. They are not, as noted earlier, exhaustive either by time
or specifications. Continuity and variety are presumed; less traditional
activities can also be pursued — some way of disabusing the Venezuelan
obsession that Essequibo is Venezuelan. Wariness of Venezuelan type “joint
development” will have to be presumed. In the pre-1992 period, there existed a
strong view that some interim or short term accommodation must be sought so as
to permit development in the Essequibo including the building of hydroelectric
projects. This development, if eventually pursued, will certainly require
international private or public investment, and will also enforce the valuable
foreign policy support which can be termed “resource diplomacy.”
15. It is
well contended how minimal is the financial interest Guyana can actually
channel into real diplomatic support. The international support which Guyana
has cultivated so far is based essentially on principle and admiration for a
small, developing country charting its own path towards economic development.
But principle and admiration cannot forever keep an aggressor nation at bay.
Guyana should not overlook or underestimate the effectiveness of the
considerable respect and admiration for Venezuela in international and,
particularly in third world circles, despite the land grabbing predilection. It
will be recalled, that in spite of Venezuela’s prominent support in 1982 for
Argentina on the Malvinas (Falklands) issue, British financial circles readily
sought to assist Venezuela in its economic and financial problems. The
solidarity of British financial interest and investment in Venezuela was a
determining factor in providing economic support, rather than the memory of
Venezuela’s political and diplomatic support for Argentina. Generally, contrary
to most early predictions, there was also far less political fall out between
the United Kingdom and Latin America in the post Malvinas period and the situation.
Actually, the
Guyana government of that period understood the British economic position
vis-à-vis Venezuela. Interestingly, when the war over the Malvinas (Falklands)
broke out, the Guyana government expressed strong support for the United
Kingdom, but on March 1, 1985, President Forbes Burnham in an interview
published in the Venezuelan newspaper, El Nacional, stated a changed position:
“In Lima, Peru, I think it was in 1975, at a meeting of Non-Aligned Foreign
Ministers, we supported the right of ownership that Argentina had to the
Falkland Islands. And that position, we have retained. When the war between
Britain and Argentina took place . . ., our position was that we opposed
Argentina’s using force. That is all. Subsequently, when the matter came up for
discussion in the United Nations General Assembly, Britain was flabbergasted to
find that we were on the side of Argentina’s right. You must distinguish
between the right and attempts to exercise that right by force.”
16. Overall,
the preservation of Guyana’s territorial integrity in the face of a real
threat, though with changing dimensions, will remain the supreme national
interest in the foreseeable future.
17. At the
end of 2014, the Guyana government stated that it was no longer interested in
the continuation of the UN Good Offices process since it has proven to be
unproductive and indicated it would propose to the Secretary General that the
issue should be presented to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On the
other hand, Venezuela wants a continuation of the Good Offices process and does
not support recourse to the ICJ. (However, the Guyana government has to bear in
mind that the onus is on Venezuela to present its case of the nullity of the
1899 award to an international court. In reality, Guyana does not have to do so
since it maintains that the border dispute was already settled in 1899; that
the award is legally binding; and that it does not recognise any territorial
claim to any part of its sovereign territory.)
FUNDAMENTAL
ASPECTS OF GUYANA-VENEZUELA RELATIONS
18. The
fundamental aspects affecting the Guyana-Venezuela relationship can be placed
in two categories — negative and positive from the Guyana standpoint. There are
three negative factors:
(i) It should
be considered obvious that Guyana would find it difficult to stand up to the
economic and military potential of Venezuela without external support.
Venezuela is the sixth largest country in South America in area and fifth in
terms of population. It has enormous natural resources. In petroleum, it is
estimated that the reserves total 700 billion barrels, with the total proven
being 297 billion barrels. A significant part of the petroleum resources are in
the states near or bordering the Essequibo, e.g., in the Orinoco basin, Monagas,
Guarico and Anzoategui. Also in the border states are iron ore deposits, 60
percent pure, estimated at 1,800,000 tons; gold, gems, diamonds and various
minerals such as manganese, nickel, vanadium, chrome, lead, zinc, copper,
bauxite, phosphate and asbestos. In addition, the Orinoco and its tributaries
possess massive hydroelectric resources, with the Caroni potential being 10.5
million kilowatts.
(ii) Guyana
has virtually no guarantors to defend its territorial integrity. Guyana’s
historic allies (in the Caribbean) are small and some distance from the
possible battlefield, or (in Africa and Asia) too far away. Representatives of
a number of great power countries participated in the arbitration settlement
but this does not by itself bind those countries to guarantee the settlement
after it was challenged by Venezuela. Venezuela on the other hand has an
advantage because of its early start in national self determination from the
1820s to build solidarity with other Latin American countries under the Inter American
system, the OAS and, specifically, the Inter American Treaty for Reciprocal
Assistance.
(iii) The
socio economic situation in each country has all the ingredients for
misunderstanding and conflict. There is a clash of culture and ideology, which
finds expression both in the highest institutions of Venezuelan political life
and in the official relations with Guyana. The lack of contact and empathy
between the two peoples, partly the result of the policy of the former colonial
powers, accentuates the difficulties in cooperation. It must also be understood
that Latin, hence Venezuelan, emotionalism about “patria” represents an
important factor in Latin conceptualizations about nationhood. Thus the
continued existence of economic problems always presents an opportunity to the
Venezuelan government to resort to the traditional ploy of seeking external
issues that evoke emotional patriotism to divert attention from domestic
pressures.
19. On the
positive side there are also three factors which favour Guyana directly or
obstruct an aggressive Venezuela in pursuit of its claim through violence:
(i) There is
the ecological determinant of the land area under claim. The nature of the
terrain, comprising dense tropical forests and the closeness and steepness of the
hills and mountains and the un-navigable rivers, impeded European colonial
settlement from the seventeenth century onwards. It would certainly be a
fundamental deterrent to an invader from the west.
(ii) This
first consideration leads to the second positive element in the type of war
chosen by the aggressor — air, sea or land. The invader could conceivably land
forces and control some areas, but unlike Ankoko, he would be operating far
from base, without assured means of communication and supply.
(iii) The
third factor in Guyana’s favour is the question of possession. Guyana is in the
eyes of the international community in legal and political control of the area
under claim. The status quo power is to Guyana’s advantage. Guyana can contend
that the affair has long been settled, that there is no border dispute, and
what Guyanese are engaged on is the pursuit of a policy of stability and
defense. Guyana may need to defend its views only when attacks, either verbal
or written, are made.
OBJECTIVES OF
GUYANA
20. The
policy Guyana may wish to pursue in dealing with the Venezuelan threat may be
set out in the following long term and short term objectives.
The long term
objectives are:
a) the
security of the borders devolved to the new state at the time of independence,
and internationally recognised;
b) the
achievement of a final settlement of the dispute with Venezuela.
The short
term objectives are:
a) the
maintenance of the territorial status quo pending the resolution of the
problem;
b) the
elimination of the immediate threat to the security and territorial integrity
of Guyana;
c) bringing
an end to the continued military, economic, political and diplomatic harassment
of Guyana — the armed incursions, airspace and marine violations, subversion
and interference with the country’s economic development;
d) securing
the withdrawal of the Venezuelan military forces from the Guyana section of
Ankoko Island, illegally occupied since 1966.
THE POLITICAL
ASPECT
21. Over the
years Guyana has achieved a remarkable degree of success in its diplomatic
efforts regarding the border issue with Venezuela. As a result of these efforts
Guyana has been able to secure the outright support for the preservation of its
territorial integrity from many of its foreign friends. There are still others
who would like to see the matter resolved peacefully through negotiation. China
falls in this category, obviously as a result of its own border problems with
Russia and India. The response of the international community and perhaps also
the outcome of the Malvinas war in the early 1980s have, without doubt, served
as a restraining influence upon Venezuela not to pursue a military option.
22. Guyana
must continue efforts at closer cooperation with Brazil and Columbia, and to
counteract Venezuelan efforts to “purchase” the sympathy of some Caricom
countries. Guyana also has to pursue its relationship with the United States
government in a manner designed to encourage it to pressure Venezuela to accept
the finality of the 1899 award.
23. Another
important factor that will contribute to Guyana’s policy calculations is the
fact that so far, any new President of Venezuela is bound to a strongly
nationalist posture and, consequently, is tied to a hard line position against
Guyana in any future negotiations. Guyana has had overall success of its
policies over the years in weakening the position of Venezuela internationally.
This has created greater doubts in the minds of the Venezuelan government about
its ability to pursue a successful claim to Guyana’s territory. Such a
situation can lead a Venezuelan President, who had taken a strong position in
his election campaign, to adopt a posture of proud national obstinacy to accept
as a peaceful settlement nothing less than all of Guyana’s territory under claim.
24. The
resulting impasse (as the search for a “practical” settlement in Venezuelan
terms is frustrated) can only serve to heighten tensions, particularly within a
restive society as Venezuela appears to becoming. This restiveness is
apparently being transmitted to the military which has a strong influence on
the Venezuelan government.
25. On the
other hand, the optimist can see positive signs leading to a real improvement
in Guyana’s relations with Venezuela. There appears to be a general feeling of
satisfaction in Venezuela that the choice of means of peaceful settlement,
within the context of the Geneva Agreement, is now in the hands of the UN
Secretary General. Despite this, a great proportion of the population seemed to
have “forgotten” this fact, and easily fall prey to politicians’ demands for
Venezuela to seize the western Essequibo by military force. Such a position
goes against the grain of their government’s agreement to put the matter into
the hands of the UN Secretary General.
26. With
these developments, a vacuum is being created which could be filled in the
course of normal bilateral relations with positive or negative actions. Guyana
must step up the process of active bilateral cooperation.
27. Guyana
must also work to influence opinion in Venezuela itself for the withdrawal of
the claim to western Essequibo. Some media reports from Venezuela indicate that
the Venezuelan government has reservations that it can ever achieve what it is
claiming. The late President Hugo Chavez himself has stated that a “practical
settlement” means obtaining at least a part of the territory. He also admitted
that the border issue was raised in 1962 as part of the “imperialist” plan to
remove the pro-socialist government of Guyana of that period.
THE ECONOMIC
ASPECT
28. The
suggestions and recommendations, given below, though essentially of an economic
nature, nevertheless have an ultimate political dimension. Furthermore while
the implementation of any or all of them would not guarantee the preservation
of Guyana’s territorial integrity, it is believed that the overall effect would
be to dissuade or restrain any precipitate action by Venezuela.
29. At the
moment, the Essequibo region is a large sprawling area mostly undeveloped and
sparsely populated. It is suggested therefore that the Guyana government, as a
matter of policy should give a high priority to the development of the region.
This includes the relocation of people from the urban areas for their direct
involvement in agriculture and industry in the interior. At the same time
resource diplomacy should be actually pursued to encourage mineral exploration,
forestry and agricultural development particularly through joint ventures with
foreign governments and companies.
30. Because
of the sheer size of the area being dealt with, government programmes for
large-scale development would obviously have to be of a long-term nature.
Furthermore, it is accepted that many of the infrastructural works large scale
development would ultimately require to be executed by government agencies,
would now be beyond the financial reach of the government.
31. In the
circumstances the following suggestions are made:
(a) The
preparation and implementation of a comprehensive economic development plan for
western Essequibo must be regarded as a priority. Implementation of this
strategy is urgent and vital for the long term security of western Essequibo.
Numerous media reports, many originating in Venezuela from time to time, refer
to the area as uninhabited jungle tracks or no man’s land. While this may be a
characteristic feature of other South American border and territorial disputes
— a factor which prompts the original claims — the record of development in the
area should be publicised. Nevertheless, it can be asserted that if western Essequibo
were fully settled and developed with a larger population, the outrageous claim
would not have been made. Emphasis should be given in the plan to establish
sites adjacent to the actual Guyana Venezuela boundary and especially the North
West District, the area strategically controlling the Orinoco Basin. At the
same time, a policy to “humanise” the frontier areas, through land development
schemes, should be drafted and implemented. Such settlements will promote
security and also provide logistic support, including food supplies, to
Guyana’s military forces. While the government encourages more civilian
settlements in the frontier area, it must, at the same time, seek to upgrade
the quality of life in the border areas since it is necessary to demonstrate to
the local population that loyalty to Guyana is also to their personal
advantage, and that a better life is attainable in Guyana. Consideration should
be given to attracting skilled immigrants into this area. Re-migrants should
also be granted lucrative packages to settle in this area.
(b) It is
highly recommended that priority should be given to Guyana-Brazil road project,
i.e., from Lethem to Georgetown. This international highway once completed,
would hold great economic and political significance to the territorial claim.
The political benefits to Guyana would be substantial. The major regional
power, Brazil, which participates in its construction, would insure its safety
and that of the surrounding territory from attack. The highway would help strengthen
Guyana’s title to the Essequibo, thereby further minimising Venezuela’s chances
to appropriate it.
(c) Guyana
must continue to promote, on a selective basis, foreign investment in resource
development in western Essequibo.
(d) The
government should actively encourage the private sector to get involved in
agriculture and other industries in the area. The government itself should seek
joint ventures with foreign firms to exploit the vast resources in the area.
The size of holdings in the area should be large enough to make them attractive
to the private sector and to persons who would have had some training already
in agricultural and other skills. Leases should be for a minimum of twenty-five
years with the usual provision about beneficial occupation.
(e) To make
the foregoing idea attractive to both the local and foreign entrepreneurs,
consideration should be given to making a part, if not the whole area, a
special economic zone. Within such a zone, entrepreneurs would be given special
tax concessions and foreign currency facilities and special concessions for the
use of state lands, etc., on condition that the greater part of what is
produced would be for export.
(f)
Information materials on Guyana should be published in international trade and
industry journals inviting foreign participation in the development of the
western Essequibo in particular.
32. The idea
of making the Essequibo region or part of it an economic zone with special
investment and other benefits would call for a detailed study by Guyana’s
economic, sociological and other experts. But it is believed that these
schemes, if well coordinated and supervised by a competent regional
administration, would have almost unlimited possibilities in the long term and
a number of immediate (short term) advantages. Among these are:
(i) An
attractive investment climate would induce the expansion and development of
industries which are already operating in the region (timber, mining,
quarrying, etc.). It would attract new investment.
(ii) There
would be new and increased opportunities for employment which would ease the
unemployment situation in urban areas.
(iii) There
would be a gradual but definite improvement of the national economy.
(iv)
Populating and developing the area would signal Guyana’s determination to hold
on to territory which is traditionally and legally Guyanese.
STRATEGY OF
DETERRENCE
33. Current
steps being taken to reduce tensions with Venezuela should be continued and the
joint commissions must step up their work.
34. It was no
surprise that, when the border controversy was about to be submitted the UN
Secretary General, Venezuela rejected judicial procedures for settlement. In
making the proposal, Guyana applied an excellent tactic to force Venezuela to
retreat from its age long preference for negotiations and to thus implicitly
admit publicly that there is no legal justification for its claim. This move
revealed the gaps in Venezuela’s decision-making armoury and the incoherence of
its foreign policy approach. The point must be stressed that the UN Secretary
General is not a mediator and that his role is essentially that of an
intermediary for the selection of settlement procedures.
35. Guyana
must also take steps to deter and persuade hostile elements in the Venezuelan
military from pursuing the course of threats and harassment. The strategy of
deterrence could be examined from both political and psychological viewpoints.
The former would involve preparation for any military action, by the assembly
of a strong defensive military capability. The classic idea of this strategy is
to pose to the potential aggressor heavy material costs and damage far
outweighing the advantage he would secure if the act of aggression is
successful. If military threats are made against Guyana, consideration may be
given to strengthen national military and paramilitary forces with Commonwealth
or United Nations peace-making forces.
36. The
psychological aspect of deterrence constitutes making use of the international
media to serve the national objective. It should be noted that international
public relations is a highly specialist function. It is an area in which
professional formation of Guyanese personnel should be developed. In the 1980s,
the Venezuelan claim earned wide publicity at a time when there were severe
international crises. However, the press coverage generally showed a bias
against Guyana. Mention was made of western Essequibo as a chunk of jungle or
“no man’s land” inhabited by a handful of Amerindians. Venezuela was described
as the oil rich state without economic problems, and Guyana as poor and
impoverished with either a tiny defence force or utterly defenceless. One
writer claimed that Venezuela was the wronged party because that country had no
say in the establishment of the rules of the Paris arbitration tribunal. With
respect to the Protocol of Port of Spain, he suggested, inter alia, “if
Venezuela agreed to a twelve year moratorium it must mean that Venezuela has
not been unreasonable or it would not have agreed to it in the first place.”
37. From a
Venezuelan philosophical perspective, much play has been made of Bolivar’s
thoughts on Latin American solidarity and integration, and the Venezuelan
government’s toleration of Amerindians, as if these ideas are not applicable to
Guyana. Guyana’s population is rated a minority in Latin America, with no
challenge to the Bolivarian brotherhood.
INITIATIVES
IN DIPLOMACY
38. The use
of diplomacy to achieve the desired objective of a lasting solution is as
complex as the issue itself. It is indeed a challenge both to the policy
planner and to the decision maker. The international situation, which
influences national policy and is itself affected by such policy/decisions,
does not remain constant and is always in a state of flux. Making assessments
on a politically volatile country such as Venezuela is not an easy task.
However one with great trepidation may deduce some of the factors influencing
Venezuelan thinking and attempt to arrive at some conclusions.
39. There is
also another important factor: the growing influence of Venezuela in OPEC. With
this is mind, Guyana must work to influence OPEC states to support its
position. Continuing Guyana’s diplomacy among Arab states, particularly within
the ambit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), is therefore a
prime necessity. This has been done, especially from 1997, but it must be
stepped up especially at this time.
40. Guyana’s
diplomatic options are significant. For instance at the bilateral level, Brazil
will continue to be supportive of Guyana’s efforts to preserve peace and
stability in the region. Important Latin American countries such as Argentina,
Mexico, Chile and Peru should have no difficulty in the maintenance of the
territorial status quo. In the Caribbean, Guyana can continue to count on the
understanding and solidarity of Guyana’s Caricom partners. While continuing to
work within the OAS, Guyana must increase its role in the Association of
Caribbean States, the Treaty of Amazonian Cooperation, the Rio Group and
UNASUR.
41. Guyana must
also continue consolidating its support. In this regard, it should work to
ensure that those nations and international and regional organs that
traditionally provide support continue to do so. Guyana must approach the
British government to be more pro-active in the issue, since it is also a party
to the 1899 arbitral award and the Geneva Agreement. Certain countries of
Africa and Asia could be considered Guyana’s natural allies and the Guyana
government should keep them fully informed at all times. Countries like Cuba
which have given support firmly and publicly in the past, should not be allowed
to slide into a neutral stance. Guyana should ensure that Cuba continues to
give clear support as in the past. However, it must be borne in mind that with
the current close Venezuela-Cuba alliance, Cuba may want to “soften” its
support for the Guyana position.
42. At the
regional level, Guyana’s diplomatic efforts must continue in order to seek
agreement for the establishment of a Zone of Peace in the Caribbean and of
strengthening the operative aspects of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation.
43. At the
international level, Guyana should continue the briefing and publicity
campaigns at the United Nations, the Organization of American States, the Group
of 77, the Association of Caribbean States, the Commonwealth and directly to
the members of the Non Aligned Movement. In Europe, borders of nation states
have changed with each European war down to the present day; the support of
European countries in Guyana’s case would add an important dimension in the
territorial controversy.
44. At the UN
General Assembly, Guyana must ensure that all member-states understand and
support Guyana’s position. Guyana must also continue to support all issues
dealing with peaceful settlements of disputes and non-use of force and the
prohibition of the occupation of territory by force as in the case of (i)
Israel’s occupation of Palestinian Territory, and (ii) the division of Cyprus.
45. Guyana
must deepen a dialogue with the United States of America and the Latin American
states. In this respect, the following areas must be considered for emphasis:
(a) The
initiation of a comprehensive dialogue with the USA
It must be
borne in mind that it was the United States that took the side of Venezuela in
1895 and eventually forced both Venezuela and Great Britain to agree to
arbitration. The award of 1899 could therefore be regarded as a victory for US
diplomacy. Guyana must, in its diplomatic communication with the United States
authorities, urge that government’s influence on Venezuela to withdraw its
claim to Guyana’s territory. At the same time, Guyana should request the United
States to declare its unqualified support for respect for international
treaties and the sanctity of borders.
Currently, in
the eyes of the USA, the Venezuelan claim and aggressive attitude towards
Guyana does not constitute a threat to the peace and security of the region,
but the narco-production and trafficking in Latin America, the guerrilla
activities in Colombia, and also the current Venezuela-Cuba alliance do.
It seems,
therefore, that initiatives can be undertaken at an official level to seek a
dialogue with US administration officials. If Guyana is not able to convince
the American government of the validity of the Guyana position, then at least
the American government can be made aware that its “legitimate” security
concerns and strategy in the region run the risk of heightening tensions at
other regional levels. Such tensions can foster among smaller regional states
the very insecurity which the US strives to avoid. There exist in the
hemisphere numerous bilateral boundary problems, and the US should not be
insensitive to such a demarche, especially when articulated against the
background its own close relations with Caricom. It must be emphasised to US
officials that Guyana’s economic development is being directly frustrated by
Venezuelan aggressive activities manifested in international economic for a —
activities which run directly counter to the American plan to promote economic
growth in the Caribbean Basin.
Apart from
speaking with the US administration officials, conversations must be initiated
with influential members of the US Congress, especially with committee members
dealing with the Western Hemisphere, and with those who frame public opinion in
the USA.
(b)
Maintenance of very good relations with Brazil
Brazil once
attracted the hostility of Venezuela. The position is now changed and there are
now cordial relations including economic cooperation between the two states.
There are some basic factors that will influence Brazil to support Guyana:
(1) Brazil is
the only Portuguese speaking country in the mostly Spanish-speaking Latin
America and must therefore, as the odd nation out, cultivate links with English-speaking
territories including Guyana.
(2) Brazil
has borders with most countries in South America. Many of these have not been
fully defined, and the eruption of a border conflict (such as between Guyana
and Venezuela) could lead to the eruption of other border conflicts which would
affect that country.
(3) Brazil,
in terms of size, is now the largest industrial power in Latin America and
would not wish to be challenged by an enlarged Venezuela.
(4) Guyana
provides a bridgehead for the Caribbean markets and easy access to Roraima
State. Brazil actively seeks cooperation with Guyana to assure its
accessibility to port facilities on the Guyana coast.
(5) Guyana
and Brazil have implemented a bilateral free-trade agreement.
(c) Regular
high level contacts with Caricom
High level
contacts and information sharing with Caricom Heads of Government and Foreign
Ministers will help their citizens to have an innate understanding of Guyana’s
border problems. Guyana should also maintain close coordination with Belize, as
any concession by Belize to Guatemala could adversely affect the Guyanese
position.
It seems that
work will have to be continued to further improve Guyana’s image in the English
speaking Caribbean countries. Their support for Guyana’s cause has been firm,
but this must not be taken for granted. Perhaps the time is opportune to
establish a permanent presence in the Eastern Caribbean. Guyana could perhaps
upgrade its representation in Trinidad and Tobago from where Barbados, Grenada
and the other islands could also be serviced. In the absence of a high-level
permanent presence in the region, it would be useful if Guyana appoints a
resident ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean to promote and maintain closer
ties.
(d) A
deepening of the rapprochement process with Suriname
A settlement
of Guyana’s maritime boundary with Suriname has effectively removed a huge
impediment to its economic development thus reducing the diplomatic pressure on
its eastern flank. However, Suriname continues to claim the New River Triangle,
but Guyana must assert its ownership to the area not only by a military
presence but by civilian settlement. The settlement of the maritime dispute
with Suriname has provided a psychological boost for Guyana as it continues to
deal with Venezuela, and hopefully this can encourage international pressure on
Venezuela to withdraw its claim.
(e)
Strengthening relations with specific Latin American countries
Guyana must
expand and strengthen relations with Colombia not only for trade but because of
that country’s border problems with Venezuela. In addition, there must be an
ongoing dialogue and strengthening of relations with Mexico, which has provided
strong support for Belize over the years.
INFLUENCING
PUBLIC OPINION
46. Through
the effective means of the Internet, information on Guyana position on the
border controversy can be effectively disseminated all over the world. At the
same time an effective education campaign in Guyana must be carried out, as
part of the school curriculum, to inform young Guyanese of the history of the
country’s borders. Such education should also embrace the tertiary educational
institutions, offices and industrial establishments. Well-produced radio and
television programmes can supplement such an activity. Printed, audio and video
resources must be prepared and readily available.
47. Since the
Guyana government wants its information to be readily available abroad, efforts
must be made to extend the range of radio transmitters to enable broadcasts to
reach out into the Caribbean. The expansion of Internet radio and television
streaming, with an emphasis on providing information worldwide in an instant,
should be seen as a priority.
48. It is
imperative that Guyana implements a deliberate, planned public relations
programme overseas to win friends and influence people through the projection
of a positive and favourable image of Guyana.
49. Implicit
in all of the above, the promotion of national unity must be seen as a cohesive
force for strategy support and tactics implementation. Regular and constructive
consultations between the government and the opposition, as well as with
organizations representing civil society, will be a necessity.
CONCLUSION
50. This
compilation presents some strategies for the preservation of Guyana’s territorial
integrity through the economic development of western Essequibo, the
establishment of a form of deterrent capability by highlighting Venezuela’s
acts of aggression in the international media, and diplomatic initiatives
especially in hemispheric and in international institutions. It is also
recommended that efforts should be made for a steady improvement in Guyana’s
relations with Venezuela.
51. The
preservation of Guyana’s territorial integrity is not a process to be viewed in
isolation. It is part of a higher duty towards national unity through
patriotism and other more tangible elements of nation building. There is,
without doubt, the need for continued vigilance; but no nation can sustain a
perpetual state of overt alertness. However, as the strategy is being applied,
the government has the duty to commit its energies completely to frustrate
Venezuela’s efforts in its unjust claims to Guyana’s sovereign territory.
New Revision:
8 June 2015
© Copyright
2015 by Odeen Ishmael
2005 La
Guayana Esequiba – Zona en Reclamación. Instituto Geográfico Simón Bolívar Primera Edición
Nota del
editor del blog:
Al referenciarse a la República Cooperativa de
Guyana se deben de tener en cuenta los 159.500Km2, de territorios ubicados al
oeste del río Esequibo conocidos con el nombre de Guayana Esequiba o Zona en
Reclamación sujetos al Acuerdo de Ginebra del 17 de febrero de 1966.
Territorios estos sobre los cuales el Gobierno
Venezolano en representación de la Nación venezolana se reservo sus derechos
sobre los territorios de la Guayana Esequiba en su nota del 26 de mayo de 1966
al reconocerse al nuevo Estado de Guyana:
“...por lo tanto, Venezuela reconoce como
territorio del nuevo Estado, el que se sitúa al este de la margen derecha del
río Esequibo y reitera ante la comunidad internacional, que se reserva
expresamente sus derechos de soberanía territorial sobre la zona que se
encuentra en la margen izquierda del precitado río; en consecuencia, el
territorio de la Guayana Esequiba sobre el cual Venezuela se reserva
expresamente sus derechos soberanos, limita al Este con el nuevo Estado de
Guyana, a través de la línea del río Esequibo, tomando éste desde su nacimiento
hasta su desembocadura en el Océano Atlántico...”
LA GUAYANA ESEQUIBA
http://laguayanaesequiba.blogspot.com/2008/01/la-guayana-esequiba.html
Terminología sobre cómo referenciar la
Zona en Reclamación-Guayana Esequiba.
Mapa que señala el
Espacio de Soberanía Marítima Venezolana que se reserva, como Mar Territorial mediante el Decreto Presidencial No 1152 del 09
de Julio de 1968
Entradas
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