lunes, 7 de mayo de 2012

Guyana. Editorial del Stabroek News “…nos hemos vuelto dependientes económicamente de Venezuela…” (La Guayana - Esequiba- Zona en Reclamación)

http://www.stabroeknews.com/2012/opinion/editorial/05/06/venezuela-2/print/


Guyana, La Guayana - Esequiba- Zona en Reclamación

Si la oposición gana en Caracas, y el resultado es aceptado por los chavistas, entonces, si bien sería una situación más difícil para este país en términos económicos como en términos de consideraciones de fronteras


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Posted By Stabroek staff On May 6, 2012 @ 5:01 am In Editorial | No Comments Publicado por Stabroek personal en 06 de mayo 2012 @ 05:01 am En Editorial | Sin Comentarios

Last week the major Venezuelan newspapers began to cautiously explore political scenarios which assumed that President Hugo Chávez would not be leading his party (The United Socialist Party) in the foreseeable future. La semana pasada los principales diarios venezolanos comenzaron a explorar con cautela los escenarios políticos que asumieron que el presidente Hugo Chávez no estaría al frente de su partido (el Partido Socialista Unido) en el futuro previsible. Venezuelan elections for the presidency are due on October 7, and while the head of state's ever increasing absences from the country have been a cause for concern, prior to this most commentators (with one major exception) confined themselves to querying the constitutionality of him not handing over power to the Vice-President in the interim, and governing from Cuba by “internet,” as his opposition rival Henrique Capriles dubbed it. Elecciones en Venezuela a la presidencia se recibirán hasta el 07 de octubre, y mientras el jefe de Estado está cada vez más las ausencias del país han sido un motivo de preocupación, antes de esto la mayoría de los comentaristas (con una excepción importante) se limitaban a la consulta de la constitucionalidad de él, no entregar el poder a la Vicepresidencia en el ínterin, y gobernar desde Cuba por "Internet", como su rival de la oposición Henrique Capriles apodado. That aside, there has been little speculation about what would happen if Mr Chávez were unable to campaign or were unable to lead his party into the polls. Aparte de eso, se ha especulado poco sobre lo que pasaría si Chávez no pudieron hacer campaña o fueron incapaces de llevar a su partido en las urnas. Of course, it is a tricky subject, because the full nature of the President's illness has been kept hidden from the public, and all spokespersons as well as Mr Chávez himself have vigorously insisted that he is on the road to recovery. Por supuesto, es un tema delicado, porque la naturaleza completa de la enfermedad del Presidente se ha mantenido oculto al público, y todos los portavoces, así como el propio señor Chávez se insistió enérgicamente en que él está en el camino hacia la recuperación.

Recent polls indicated that a large majority of Venezuelans were indeed convinced he is recuperating from an undisclosed form of cancer, and that he will lead his party into the general electiLas encuestas recientes indican que una gran mayoría de los venezolanos estaban convencidos de que realmente se está recuperando de una forma no revelada de cáncer, y que va a llevar a su partido en las elecciones generales. Having said that, one might have thought that the formerly unshakeable confidence of at least a few of them might have been undermined by the sight of him at a public mass in his home state of Barinas on April 30, weeping and asking God for a “miracle.” However, most seem to have written it off as another example of the President's penchant for theatricality. Una vez dicho esto, uno podría haber pensado que la confianza inquebrantable que antes de por lo menos algunos de ellos podrían haber sido socavada por la visión de él en una misa pública en su estado natal de Barinas el 30 de abril, llorando y pidiendo a Dios por una " milagro ". Sin embargo, la mayoría parece que la han descartado como otro ejemplo de la inclinación del Presidente para la teatralidad. The change in the political firmament which occurred last week, in contrast, was a development of an altogether different order which was much harder to dismiss out of hand. El cambio en el firmamento político que se produjo la semana pasada, en cambio, fue un desarrollo de un orden totalmente diferente, que era mucho más difícil de despedir de la mano.

That development was the establishment of a Council of State, set up under the 1999 constitution, and chaired by the current Vice-President, Elías Jaua, a sociologist by training and former student radical. Ese desarrollo fue la creación de un Consejo de Estado, creado en virtud de la Constitución de 1999, y presidido por el actual vicepresidente, Elías Jaua, un sociólogo de profesión y antiguo estudiante radical. According to El Universal, four of the other five members are also civilians, namely, José Vicente Rangel, the left-wing journalist and lawyer who was Minister of Defence for a time in the early part of Chávez's period of office, but who left government some years ago; Roy Chaderton, a senior diplomat and lawyer who at present is the Ambassador to the OAS; Germán Mundaraín, a lawyer who was the Ombudsman for seven years; and Luis Britto García, a writer, lawyer, sociologist, university teacher and Chávez loyalist. Según El Universal, cuatro de los otros cinco miembros son también los civiles, a saber, José Vicente Rangel, el periodista de izquierda y abogado que fue ministro de Defensa durante un tiempo en la primera parte del período de Chávez en el cargo, pero que dejó el gobierno Hace algunos años, Roy Chaderton, un diplomático de alto rango y abogado que en la actualidad es el embajador ante la OEA, alemán Mundaraín, un abogado que fue el Defensor del Pueblo durante siete años, y Luis Britto García, escritor, abogado, sociólogo, profesor universitario y Chávez leal. The military representative is Admiral Carlos Rafael Giacoppini, who heads the secretariat of the National Defence Council. El representante militar es el almirante Carlos Rafael Giacoppini, que dirige la secretaría del Consejo de Defensa Nacional.

The council has clearly been installed to make decisions on behalf of President Chávez, and it has already been announced that its first task is to consider whether Venezuela should withdraw from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, something which the head of state had already indicated he wanted done. El consejo ha sido claramente instalado para tomar decisiones en nombre del Presidente Chávez, y ya se ha anunciado que su primera tarea consiste en examinar si Venezuela debe retirarse de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, algo que el jefe de Estado ya había indicó que quería hacer. There is no doubt that particularly this year, there has been the sense of a power vacuum in Caracas, and in that context there have been references in the media to in-fighting among the various Chávista factions. No hay duda de que todo este año, ha habido la sensación de un vacío de poder en Caracas, y en ese contexto se han hecho referencias en los medios de comunicación en la lucha entre las diversas facciones chavistas. It is in the light of this that El Nuevo Herald has submitted that the council's main function is to contain these factional struggles and prevent an outright confrontation between the various groups. Es a la luz de esto que El Nuevo Herald, ha afirmado que la principal función del Consejo es la de contener las luchas entre facciones y evitar una confrontación abierta entre los distintos grupos.

What several of the newspapers have now ventured to suggest is that Mr Chávez will not lead his party into the election and that another candidate will be chosen. Lo que varios de los periódicos han aventurado a sugerir es que el señor Chávez no va a llevar a su partido en las elecciones y que otro candidato será elegido. While the official line is that there is no candidate other than Chávez, El Nacional has put forward the possibility of it being either Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro, Jaua, or Diosdado Cabello, the President of the National Assembly and a comrade-in-arms of Chávez during the failed coup of 1992. Mientras que la línea oficial es que no hay otro candidato que Chávez, El Nacional ha planteado la posibilidad de que sea o bien el canciller Nicolás Maduro, Jaua, o Diosdado Cabello, el Presidente de la Asamblea Nacional y un compañero de armas de Chávez durante el golpe de Estado fallido de 1992. For its part El Nuevo Herald reported political analysts as saying Maduro was the most likely candidate, because he would be “highly competitive at the polls.” Por su parte El Nuevo Herald informó analistas políticos diciendo que Maduro fue el candidato más probable, porque sería "altamente competitivo en las urnas".

Nelson Bocaranda, a columnist in El Universal, has been the exception to the generalization made in the first paragraph, since for some time he has been giving gloomy assessments of the President's medical status, which he has attributed to unnamed medical sources. Nelson Bocaranda, un columnista de El Universal, ha sido la excepción a la generalización hecha en el primer párrafo, ya que desde hace algún tiempo se ha estado dando las evaluaciones pesimistas de la situación médica del Presidente, que ha atribuido a fuentes anónimas de médicos. At a much earlier stage he had said that Maduro would be identified to lead the party, and he repeated that again recently. En una etapa muy anterior había dicho que Maduro se identificó a dirigir el partido, y reiteró que de nuevo recientemente. He has also claimed that there have been discussions in Cuba between the senior military officers concerning the political future of Venezuela, although the accuracy of what he has said about those meetings is impossible to gauge. También ha afirmado que ha habido discusiones en Cuba entre los oficiales militares de alto rango sobre el futuro político de Venezuela, a pesar de la exactitud de lo que ha dicho acerca de esas reuniones es imposible de evaluar. It should perhaps be mentioned that a few months ago Mr Chávez himself identified Maduro and Cabello as candidates for governorships in the elections, and if he held to that it would put both of them out of the running to take over the party. Tal vez hay que mencionar que hace unos meses el propio señor Chávez identificó a Maduro y Cabello como candidatos a gobernaciones en las elecciones, y si él se sostuvo para que pondría tanto de ellos fuera de la carrera para hacerse cargo de la fiesta.

According to the last Datanalysis poll, the President is still way ahead of his rival in the run-up to the election, with a rating of 44% as against 31% for Capriles; 20% of respondents, the pollster said, were undecided. Según la encuesta de Datanálisis pasado, el presidente sigue siendo muy por delante de su rival en el período previo a las elecciones, con una calificación de 44% frente al 31% para Capriles, el 20% de los encuestados, el encuestador, dijo, estaban indecisos. However, opposition chances would increase dramatically if Mr Chávez himself was not on the ticket, some earlier polls indicating that the President's party could not win without him. Sin embargo, lo más probable oposición se incrementaría dramáticamente si el propio señor Chávez no estaba en el billete, algunas encuestas anteriores que indican que el partido del Presidente no podía ganar sin él. In that kind of a scenario no one knows what could happen. En ese tipo de escenario que nadie sabe lo que podría suceder. The head of state has never cultivated a successor – quite the opposite in fact; he has made a point of moving anyone who could be a competitor or threaten his dominance. El jefe de Estado nunca se ha cultivado un sucesor - todo lo contrario, de hecho, él ha hecho un punto de mover a nadie que pudiera ser un competidor o amenazar su dominio. As a consequence, there is no strong figure who could counter centrifugal tendencies and bring an unstable situation under control. Como consecuencia de ello, no hay una figura fuerte que pudiera contrarrestar las tendencias centrífugas y traer una situación de inestabilidad bajo control. As several commentators have pointed out, there are all kinds of firearms on the streets, since the policy was to arm citizen militias, and that in itself is not something conducive to stability. Como varios comentaristas han señalado, hay todo tipo de armas de fuego en las calles, ya que la política era la de armar a las milicias ciudadanas, y que en sí mismo no es algo conducente a la estabilidad. In addition, no one quite knows what role the military is going to play. Además, nadie sabe a ciencia cierta cuál es el papel de los militares va a jugar. Its officer corps is presumed to be mostly Chávez oriented, since it has been purged to achieve that end, but it includes elements who have been accused of criminal activity such as drug-trafficking, and it must be assumed that these would not want to be exposed to justice and might conceivably move to protect their interests. Su cuerpo de oficiales, se presume que es sobre todo orientado a Chávez, ya que se ha purgado para lograr ese fin, sino que incluye elementos que han sido acusadas de actividades delictivas como el tráfico de drogas, y hay que suponer que estos no quieren ser expuestos a la justicia y, posiblemente, podría actuar para proteger sus intereses.

From Guyana's point of view, the long and the short of it is that we are in no position to predict with any accuracy what is going to happen in the nation to our west in the next few months. Desde el punto de vista de Guyana, el largo y el corto de él es que no estamos en condiciones de predecir con exactitud lo que va a suceder en la nación a nuestro oeste, en los próximos meses. Like several Caribbean territories we have become dependent on Venezuela economically through the PetroCaribe concession and our rice exports to that country. Al igual que varios territorios del Caribe, nos hemos vuelto dependientes de Venezuela económicamente a través de la concesión de PetroCaribe y de nuestras exportaciones de arroz a ese país. We are not as exposed in terms of oil as some countries, since we receive only 50% of our fuel needs from Venezuela, but should those supplies dry up for whatever reason, it would still be a body blow. No estamos tan expuestos en términos de petróleo, ya que algunos países, ya que sólo reciben el 50% de nuestras necesidades de combustible de Venezuela, pero de las que se debe secar por alguna razón, todavía sería un duro golpe. Certainly Capriles' foreign policy advisor, Carlos Romero, has been reported as saying that should his candidate win the election, he would end Venezuela's “asymmetrical” economic arrangements, and PetroCaribe which costs $3.2B would be “re-evaluated.“ Venezuela would, he said, provide subsidized oil to “the poorest countries, such as Haiti, but there will not be subsidies for countries like Cuba…“ Ciertamente, asesor de política exterior Capriles, Carlos Romero, ha sido reportado como diciendo que debe su candidato a ganar las elecciones, que pondría fin a "asimétrica" ​​de Venezuela, los acuerdos económicos y de Petrocaribe, que cuesta $ 3.2B se "re-evaluado." Venezuela sería, , dijo, ofrecer petróleo subsidiado a "los países más pobres, como Haití, pero no habrá subsidios para países como Cuba ..."

Even if Guyana qualified in terms of Capriles' “poorest” categorization, his party has made the border an election issue, so the Guyana government should not be optimistic about any concessions from that direction. Aunque Guyana calificado en términos de "los más pobres" Capriles "categorización, su partido ha hecho de la frontera en un tema electoral, por lo que el gobierno de Guyana no debería ser optimista acerca de las concesiones por parte de esa dirección. Caricom itself – not to mention Cuba, of course, which according to a Venezuelan opposition lawmaker has received $28.5B from Venezuela between 2005 and 2011 – will have to confront a serious economic situation. Caricom sí mismo - por no hablar de Cuba, por supuesto, que de acuerdo a un legislador de la oposición venezolana ha recibido US $ 28.5B de Venezuela entre 2005 y 2011 - tendrá que enfrentarse a una grave situación económica. There is always the possibility that Mr Chávez will recover sufficiently to be the presidential candidate in October, and if that happens, he may have a good chance of winning. Siempre existe la posibilidad de que el señor Chávez se recuperará lo suficiente como para ser el candidato a la presidencia en octubre, y si eso sucede, él puede tener una buena oportunidad de ganar. If he does, Caricom will no doubt heave a collective sigh of relief since Venezuelan policy would be unlikely to change – at least in the short term. Si lo hace, la Caricom, sin duda, un suspiro colectivo de alivio ya que la política venezolana es poco probable que cambie - al menos en el corto plazo.

If the opposition wins in Caracas, and the result is accepted by the Chavistas, then while it would be a more difficult situation for this country in economic terms as well as in terms of boundary considerations, at least there would be a recognized government in Miraflores with whom we could deal. Si la oposición gana en Caracas, y el resultado es aceptado por los chavistas, entonces, si bien sería una situación más difícil para este país en términos económicos como en términos de consideraciones de fronteras, por lo menos habría un gobierno reconocido en Miraflores con los que podía tratar. Instability next door or some kind of military configuration, however, would present much greater problems for us, since one could never be sure what direction these would take, and whether the border controversy would be seized upon by manipulative elements for nefarious reasons. Puerta de la inestabilidad que viene o algún tipo de configuración militar, sin embargo, se presentan problemas mucho más grandes para nosotros, ya que uno nunca puede estar seguro de qué dirección tomaría éstos, y si la controversia fronteriza se aprovechada por los elementos de manipulación por razones infames.

In the meantime one can only hope that Takuba Lodge and the government as a whole have been doing some contingency planning in terms of policy and diplomatic strategies, and that our embassy in Caracas is monitoring events in Venezuela very closely so that credible analyses can be transmitted back to Georgetown. Mientras tanto sólo nos queda esperar que Takuba Lodge y el gobierno en su conjunto han estado haciendo un poco de planificación de contingencia en términos de política y estrategias diplomáticas, y que nuestra embajada en Caracas está monitoreando los acontecimientos en Venezuela muy de cerca por lo que los análisis creíbles pueden ser transmitidos realizar copias de seguridad de Georgetown. The one thing the administration should not be doing is assuming that the relatively benign relationship we have had with Venezuela in recent times is necessarily going to continue indefinitely; we should never be in a position where we are taken by surprise. La única cosa que la administración no debería estar haciendo es asumir que la relación relativamente benigno que hemos tenido con Venezuela en los últimos tiempos es necesariamente va a continuar indefinidamente, nunca debemos estar en una posición en la que se toman por sorpresa. Finally, this is one clear issue where the government could seek input from the opposition so any possible positions worked out in relation to potential scenarios could receive a 'national' imprimatur. Por último, este es un asunto claro que el gobierno podría solicitar la opinión de la oposición para todas las posiciones posibles elaborado en relación con los escenarios potenciales podrían recibir un "nacional" imprimatur.


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Venezuela

Posted By Stabroek staff On May 6, 2012 @ 5:01 am In Editorial | No Comments

Last week the major Venezuelan newspapers began to cautiously explore political scenarios which  assumed that President Hugo Chávez would not be leading his party (The United Socialist Party) in the foreseeable future. Venezuelan elections for the presidency are due on October 7, and while the head of state’s ever increasing absences from the country have been a cause for concern, prior to this most commentators (with one major exception) confined themselves to querying the constitutionality of him not handing over power to the Vice-President in the interim, and governing from Cuba by “internet,” as his opposition rival Henrique Capriles dubbed it. That aside, there has been little speculation about what would happen if Mr Chávez were unable to campaign or were unable to lead his party into the polls. Of course, it is a tricky subject, because the full nature of the President’s illness has been kept hidden from the public, and all spokespersons as well as Mr Chávez himself have vigorously insisted that he is on the road to recovery.

 Recent polls indicated that a large majority of Venezuelans were indeed convinced he is recuperating from an undisclosed form of cancer, and that he will lead his party into the general election. Having said that, one might have thought that the formerly unshakeable confidence of at least a few of them might have been undermined by the sight of him at a public mass in his home state of Barinas on April 30, weeping and asking God for a “miracle.” However, most seem to have written it off as another example of the President’s penchant for theatricality. The change in the political firmament which occurred last week, in contrast, was a development of an altogether different order which was much harder to dismiss out of hand.

 That development was the establishment of a Council of State, set up under the 1999 constitution, and chaired by the current Vice-President, Elías Jaua, a sociologist by training and former student radical. According to El Universal, four of the other five members are also civilians, namely, José Vicente Rangel, the left-wing journalist and lawyer who was Minister of Defence for a time in the early part of Chávez’s period of office, but who left government some years ago; Roy Chaderton, a senior diplomat and lawyer who at present is the Ambassador to the OAS; Germán Mundaraín, a lawyer who was the Ombudsman for seven years; and Luis Britto García, a writer, lawyer, sociologist, university teacher and Chávez loyalist. The military representative is Admiral Carlos Rafael Giacoppini, who heads the secretariat of the National Defence Council.

 The council has clearly been installed to make decisions on behalf of President Chávez, and it has already been announced that its first task is to consider whether Venezuela should withdraw from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, something which the head of state had already indicated he wanted done. There is no doubt that particularly this year, there has been the sense of a power vacuum in Caracas, and in that context there have been references in the media to in-fighting among the various Chávista factions. It is in the light of this that El Nuevo Herald  has submitted that the council’s main function is to contain these factional struggles and prevent an outright confrontation between the various groups.

 What several of the newspapers have now ventured to suggest is that Mr Chávez will not lead his party into the election and that another candidate will be chosen. While the official line is that there is no candidate other than Chávez, El Nacional has put forward the possibility of it being either Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro, Jaua, or Diosdado Cabello, the President of the National Assembly and a comrade-in-arms of Chávez during the failed coup of 1992. For its part El Nuevo Herald reported political analysts as saying Maduro was the most likely candidate, because he would be “highly competitive at the polls.”

 Nelson Bocaranda, a columnist in El Universal, has been the exception to the generalization made in the first paragraph, since for some time he has been giving gloomy assessments of the President’s medical status, which he has attributed to unnamed medical sources. At a much earlier stage he had said that Maduro would be identified to lead the party, and he repeated that again recently. He has also claimed that there have been discussions in Cuba between the senior military officers concerning the political future of Venezuela, although the accuracy of what he has said about those meetings is impossible to gauge. It should perhaps be mentioned that a few months ago Mr Chávez himself identified Maduro and Cabello as candidates for governorships in the elections, and if he held to that it would put both of them out of the running to take over the party.

 According to the last Datanalysis poll, the President is still way ahead of his rival in the run-up to the election, with a rating of 44% as against 31% for Capriles; 20% of respondents, the pollster said, were undecided.  However, opposition chances would increase dramatically if Mr Chávez himself was not on the ticket, some earlier polls indicating that the President’s party could not win without him. In that kind of a scenario no one knows what could happen. The head of state has never cultivated a successor – quite the opposite in fact; he has made a point of moving anyone who could be a competitor or threaten his dominance. As a consequence, there is no strong figure who could counter centrifugal tendencies and bring an unstable situation under control. As several commentators have pointed out, there are all kinds of firearms on the streets, since the policy was to arm citizen militias, and that in itself is not something conducive to stability. In addition, no one quite knows what role the military is going to play. Its officer corps is presumed to be mostly Chávez oriented, since it has been purged to achieve that end, but it includes elements who have been accused of criminal activity such as drug-trafficking, and it must be assumed that these would not want to be exposed to justice and might conceivably move to protect their interests.

 From Guyana’s point of view, the long and the short of it is that we are in no position to predict with any accuracy what is going to happen in the nation to our west in the next few months. Like several Caribbean territories we have become dependent on Venezuela economically through the PetroCaribe concession and our rice exports to that country. We are not as exposed in terms of oil as some countries, since we receive only 50% of our fuel needs from Venezuela, but should those supplies dry up for whatever reason, it would still be a body blow. Certainly Capriles’ foreign policy advisor, Carlos Romero, has been reported as saying that should his candidate win the election, he would end Venezuela’s “asymmetrical” economic arrangements, and PetroCaribe which costs $3.2B would be “re-evaluated.“ Venezuela would, he said, provide subsidized oil to “the poorest countries, such as Haiti, but there will not be subsidies for countries like Cuba…“

Even if Guyana qualified in terms of Capriles’ “poorest” categorization, his party has made the border an election issue, so the Guyana government should not be optimistic about any concessions from that direction. Caricom itself – not to mention Cuba, of course, which according to a Venezuelan opposition lawmaker has received $28.5B from Venezuela between 2005 and 2011 – will have to confront a serious economic situation. There is always the possibility that Mr Chávez will recover sufficiently to be the presidential candidate in October, and if that happens, he may have a good chance of winning. If he does, Caricom will no doubt heave a collective sigh of relief since Venezuelan policy would be unlikely to change – at least in the short term.

 If the opposition wins in Caracas, and the result is accepted by the Chavistas, then while it would be a more difficult situation for this country in economic terms as well as in terms of boundary considerations, at least there would be a recognized government in Miraflores with whom we could deal. Instability next door or some kind of military configuration, however, would present much greater problems for us, since one could never be sure what direction these would take, and whether the border controversy would be seized upon by manipulative elements for nefarious reasons.

 In the meantime one can only hope that Takuba Lodge and the government as a whole have been doing some contingency planning in terms of policy and diplomatic strategies, and that our embassy in Caracas is monitoring events in Venezuela very closely so that credible analyses can be transmitted back to Georgetown. The one thing the administration should not be doing is assuming that the relatively benign relationship we have had with Venezuela in recent times is necessarily going to continue indefinitely; we should never be in a position where we are taken by surprise. Finally, this is one clear issue where the government could seek input from the opposition so any possible positions worked out in relation to potential scenarios could receive a ‘national’ imprimatur.

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 1994 Guayana Esequiba - Zona en Reclamación MARNR Servicio Autónomo  de Geografía y Cartografía Nacional 3 Edición

Nota del editor del blog: Al referenciarse a la República Cooperativa de Guyana se deben de tener en cuenta los 159.500Km2, de territorios ubicados al oeste del río Esequibo conocidos con el nombre de Guayana Esequiba o Zona en Reclamación sujetos al Acuerdo de Ginebra del 17 de febrero de 1966.

Territorios estos sobre los cuales el gobierno Venezolano en representación de la Nación venezolana se reservo sus derechos sobre los territorios de la Guayana Esequiba en su nota del 26 de mayo de 1966 al reconocerse al nuevo Estado de Guyana .
“...por lo tanto, Venezuela reconoce como territorio del nuevo Estado, el que se sitúa al este de la margen derecha del río Esequibo y reitera ante la comunidad internacional, que se reserva expresamente sus derechos de soberanía territorial sobre la zona que se encuentra en la margen izquierda del precitado río; en consecuencia, el territorio de la Guayana Esequiba sobre el cual Venezuela se reserva expresamente sus derechos soberanos, limita al Este con el nuevo Estado de Guyana, a través de la línea del río Esequibo, tomando éste desde su nacimiento hasta su desembocadura en el Océano Atlántico...”

Mapa que señala el Espacio de Soberanía Marítima Venezolana que se reserva, como Mar Territorial mediante el Decreto Presidencial No 1152 del 09 de Julio de 1968.

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