http://www.stabroeknews.com/2012/opinion/editorial/05/06/venezuela-2/print/
Guyana, La Guayana - Esequiba- Zona en Reclamación
Si la oposición gana en Caracas, y el resultado es aceptado
por los chavistas, entonces, si bien sería una situación más difícil para este
país en términos económicos como en términos de consideraciones de fronteras
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Posted By Stabroek
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por Stabroek personal en 06 de mayo 2012 @ 05:01 am En Editorial
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Last week the major Venezuelan newspapers began to cautiously explore
political scenarios which assumed that President Hugo Chávez would not be
leading his party (The United Socialist Party) in the foreseeable future. La semana pasada los principales diarios venezolanos comenzaron a
explorar con cautela los escenarios políticos que asumieron que el presidente
Hugo Chávez no estaría al frente de su partido (el Partido Socialista Unido) en
el futuro previsible. Venezuelan
elections for the presidency are due on October 7, and while the head of
state's ever increasing absences from the country have been a cause for
concern, prior to this most commentators (with one major exception) confined
themselves to querying the constitutionality of him not handing over power to
the Vice-President in the interim, and governing from Cuba by “internet,” as
his opposition rival Henrique Capriles dubbed it. Elecciones en
Venezuela a la presidencia se recibirán hasta el 07 de octubre, y mientras el
jefe de Estado está cada vez más las ausencias del país han sido un motivo de
preocupación, antes de esto la mayoría de los comentaristas (con una excepción
importante) se limitaban a la consulta de la constitucionalidad de él, no
entregar el poder a la Vicepresidencia en el ínterin, y gobernar desde Cuba por
"Internet", como su rival de la oposición Henrique Capriles apodado. That aside, there has been little speculation
about what would happen if Mr Chávez were unable to campaign or were unable to
lead his party into the polls. Aparte de eso, se ha especulado poco
sobre lo que pasaría si Chávez no pudieron hacer campaña o fueron incapaces de
llevar a su partido en las urnas. Of
course, it is a tricky subject, because the full nature of the President's
illness has been kept hidden from the public, and all spokespersons as well as
Mr Chávez himself have vigorously insisted that he is on the road to recovery.
Por supuesto, es un tema delicado, porque la naturaleza completa de la
enfermedad del Presidente se ha mantenido oculto al público, y todos los
portavoces, así como el propio señor Chávez se insistió enérgicamente en que él
está en el camino hacia la recuperación.
Recent polls indicated that a large majority of Venezuelans were indeed
convinced he is recuperating from an undisclosed form of cancer, and that he
will lead his party into the general electiLas
encuestas recientes indican que una gran mayoría de los venezolanos estaban
convencidos de que realmente se está recuperando de una forma no revelada de
cáncer, y que va a llevar a su partido en las elecciones generales. Having said that, one might have thought that
the formerly unshakeable confidence of at least a few of them might have been
undermined by the sight of him at a public mass in his home state of Barinas on
April 30, weeping and asking God for a “miracle.” However, most seem to have
written it off as another example of the President's penchant for
theatricality. Una vez dicho esto, uno podría haber pensado que la
confianza inquebrantable que antes de por lo menos algunos de ellos podrían
haber sido socavada por la visión de él en una misa pública en su estado natal
de Barinas el 30 de abril, llorando y pidiendo a Dios por una " milagro
". Sin embargo, la mayoría parece que la han descartado como otro ejemplo
de la inclinación del Presidente para la teatralidad. The change in the political firmament which occurred last
week, in contrast, was a development of an altogether different order which was
much harder to dismiss out of hand. El cambio en el firmamento político
que se produjo la semana pasada, en cambio, fue un desarrollo de un orden
totalmente diferente, que era mucho más difícil de despedir de la mano.
That development was the establishment of a Council of State, set up
under the 1999 constitution, and chaired by the current Vice-President, Elías
Jaua, a sociologist by training and former student radical. Ese desarrollo fue la creación de un Consejo de Estado, creado en
virtud de la Constitución de 1999, y presidido por el actual vicepresidente,
Elías Jaua, un sociólogo de profesión y antiguo estudiante radical. According to El Universal, four of the other
five members are also civilians, namely, José Vicente Rangel, the left-wing
journalist and lawyer who was Minister of Defence for a time in the early part
of Chávez's period of office, but who left government some years ago; Roy
Chaderton, a senior diplomat and lawyer who at present is the Ambassador to the
OAS; Germán Mundaraín, a lawyer who was the Ombudsman for seven years; and Luis
Britto García, a writer, lawyer, sociologist, university teacher and Chávez
loyalist. Según El Universal, cuatro de los otros cinco miembros son
también los civiles, a saber, José Vicente Rangel, el periodista de izquierda y
abogado que fue ministro de Defensa durante un tiempo en la primera parte del
período de Chávez en el cargo, pero que dejó el gobierno Hace algunos años, Roy
Chaderton, un diplomático de alto rango y abogado que en la actualidad es el
embajador ante la OEA, alemán Mundaraín, un abogado que fue el Defensor del
Pueblo durante siete años, y Luis Britto García, escritor, abogado, sociólogo,
profesor universitario y Chávez leal. The
military representative is Admiral Carlos Rafael Giacoppini, who heads the
secretariat of the National Defence Council. El representante militar es
el almirante Carlos Rafael Giacoppini, que dirige la secretaría del Consejo de
Defensa Nacional.
The council has clearly been installed to make decisions on behalf of
President Chávez, and it has already been announced that its first task is to
consider whether Venezuela should withdraw from the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, something which the head of state had already indicated he
wanted done. El consejo ha sido claramente
instalado para tomar decisiones en nombre del Presidente Chávez, y ya se ha
anunciado que su primera tarea consiste en examinar si Venezuela debe retirarse
de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, algo que el jefe de Estado
ya había indicó que quería hacer. There
is no doubt that particularly this year, there has been the sense of a power
vacuum in Caracas, and in that context there have been references in the media
to in-fighting among the various Chávista factions. No hay duda de que
todo este año, ha habido la sensación de un vacío de poder en Caracas, y en ese
contexto se han hecho referencias en los medios de comunicación en la lucha
entre las diversas facciones chavistas. It is in the light of this that El Nuevo Herald has submitted that the
council's main function is to contain these factional struggles and prevent an
outright confrontation between the various groups. Es a la luz de esto
que El Nuevo Herald, ha afirmado que la principal función del Consejo es la de
contener las luchas entre facciones y evitar una confrontación abierta entre
los distintos grupos.
What several of the newspapers have now ventured to suggest is that Mr
Chávez will not lead his party into the election and that another candidate
will be chosen. Lo que varios de los periódicos han
aventurado a sugerir es que el señor Chávez no va a llevar a su partido en las
elecciones y que otro candidato será elegido. While the official line is that there is no candidate other than
Chávez, El Nacional has put forward the possibility of it being either Foreign
Minister Nicolás Maduro, Jaua, or Diosdado Cabello, the President of the
National Assembly and a comrade-in-arms of Chávez during the failed coup of
1992. Mientras que la línea oficial es que no hay otro candidato que
Chávez, El Nacional ha planteado la posibilidad de que sea o bien el canciller
Nicolás Maduro, Jaua, o Diosdado Cabello, el Presidente de la Asamblea Nacional
y un compañero de armas de Chávez durante el golpe de Estado fallido de 1992. For its part El Nuevo Herald reported
political analysts as saying Maduro was the most likely candidate, because he
would be “highly competitive at the polls.” Por su parte El Nuevo Herald
informó analistas políticos diciendo que Maduro fue el candidato más probable,
porque sería "altamente competitivo en las urnas".
Nelson Bocaranda, a columnist in El Universal, has been the exception to
the generalization made in the first paragraph, since for some time he has been
giving gloomy assessments of the President's medical status, which he has
attributed to unnamed medical sources. Nelson
Bocaranda, un columnista de El Universal, ha sido la excepción a la
generalización hecha en el primer párrafo, ya que desde hace algún tiempo se ha
estado dando las evaluaciones pesimistas de la situación médica del Presidente,
que ha atribuido a fuentes anónimas de médicos. At a much earlier stage he had said that Maduro would be
identified to lead the party, and he repeated that again recently. En
una etapa muy anterior había dicho que Maduro se identificó a dirigir el
partido, y reiteró que de nuevo recientemente. He has also claimed that there have been discussions in Cuba
between the senior military officers concerning the political future of
Venezuela, although the accuracy of what he has said about those meetings is
impossible to gauge. También ha afirmado que ha habido discusiones en
Cuba entre los oficiales militares de alto rango sobre el futuro político de
Venezuela, a pesar de la exactitud de lo que ha dicho acerca de esas reuniones
es imposible de evaluar. It should
perhaps be mentioned that a few months ago Mr Chávez himself identified Maduro
and Cabello as candidates for governorships in the elections, and if he held to
that it would put both of them out of the running to take over the party.
Tal vez hay que mencionar que hace unos meses el propio señor Chávez identificó
a Maduro y Cabello como candidatos a gobernaciones en las elecciones, y si él
se sostuvo para que pondría tanto de ellos fuera de la carrera para hacerse
cargo de la fiesta.
According to the last Datanalysis poll, the President is still way ahead
of his rival in the run-up to the election, with a rating of 44% as against 31%
for Capriles; 20% of respondents, the pollster said, were undecided. Según la encuesta de Datanálisis pasado, el presidente sigue siendo muy
por delante de su rival en el período previo a las elecciones, con una
calificación de 44% frente al 31% para Capriles, el 20% de los encuestados, el
encuestador, dijo, estaban indecisos. However,
opposition chances would increase dramatically if Mr Chávez himself was not on
the ticket, some earlier polls indicating that the President's party could not
win without him. Sin embargo, lo más probable oposición se incrementaría
dramáticamente si el propio señor Chávez no estaba en el billete, algunas
encuestas anteriores que indican que el partido del Presidente no podía ganar
sin él. In that kind of a scenario no
one knows what could happen. En ese tipo de escenario que nadie sabe lo
que podría suceder. The head of state
has never cultivated a successor – quite the opposite in fact; he has made a
point of moving anyone who could be a competitor or threaten his dominance.
El jefe de Estado nunca se ha cultivado un sucesor - todo lo contrario, de
hecho, él ha hecho un punto de mover a nadie que pudiera ser un competidor o
amenazar su dominio. As a consequence,
there is no strong figure who could counter centrifugal tendencies and bring an
unstable situation under control. Como consecuencia de ello, no hay una
figura fuerte que pudiera contrarrestar las tendencias centrífugas y traer una
situación de inestabilidad bajo control. As several commentators have pointed out, there are all kinds of firearms
on the streets, since the policy was to arm citizen militias, and that in
itself is not something conducive to stability. Como varios
comentaristas han señalado, hay todo tipo de armas de fuego en las calles, ya
que la política era la de armar a las milicias ciudadanas, y que en sí mismo no
es algo conducente a la estabilidad. In
addition, no one quite knows what role the military is going to play.
Además, nadie sabe a ciencia cierta cuál es el papel de los militares va a
jugar. Its officer corps is presumed to
be mostly Chávez oriented, since it has been purged to achieve that end, but it
includes elements who have been accused of criminal activity such as
drug-trafficking, and it must be assumed that these would not want to be
exposed to justice and might conceivably move to protect their interests.
Su cuerpo de oficiales, se presume que es sobre todo orientado a Chávez, ya que
se ha purgado para lograr ese fin, sino que incluye elementos que han sido
acusadas de actividades delictivas como el tráfico de drogas, y hay que suponer
que estos no quieren ser expuestos a la justicia y, posiblemente, podría actuar
para proteger sus intereses.
From Guyana's point of view, the long and the short of it is that we are
in no position to predict with any accuracy what is going to happen in the
nation to our west in the next few months. Desde el punto de vista de
Guyana, el largo y el corto de él es que no estamos en condiciones de predecir
con exactitud lo que va a suceder en la nación a nuestro oeste, en los próximos
meses. Like several Caribbean territories we have become dependent on Venezuela
economically through the PetroCaribe concession and our rice exports to that
country. Al igual que varios territorios del Caribe, nos hemos vuelto dependientes de
Venezuela económicamente a través de la concesión de PetroCaribe y de nuestras
exportaciones de arroz a ese país. We are not as exposed in terms of oil as some countries, since we receive
only 50% of our fuel needs from Venezuela, but should those supplies dry up for
whatever reason, it would still be a body blow. No estamos tan expuestos
en términos de petróleo, ya que algunos países, ya que sólo reciben el 50% de
nuestras necesidades de combustible de Venezuela, pero de las que se debe secar
por alguna razón, todavía sería un duro golpe. Certainly Capriles' foreign policy advisor, Carlos Romero, has
been reported as saying that should his candidate win the election, he would
end Venezuela's “asymmetrical” economic arrangements, and PetroCaribe which
costs $3.2B would be “re-evaluated.“ Venezuela would, he said, provide subsidized
oil to “the poorest countries, such as Haiti, but there will not be subsidies
for countries like Cuba…“ Ciertamente, asesor de política exterior
Capriles, Carlos Romero, ha sido reportado como diciendo que debe su candidato
a ganar las elecciones, que pondría fin a "asimétrica" de Venezuela, los acuerdos económicos y de Petrocaribe, que cuesta $
3.2B se "re-evaluado." Venezuela sería, , dijo, ofrecer petróleo
subsidiado a "los países más pobres, como Haití, pero no habrá subsidios
para países como Cuba ..."
Even if Guyana qualified in terms of Capriles' “poorest” categorization,
his party has made the border an election issue, so the Guyana government
should not be optimistic about any concessions from that direction. Aunque Guyana calificado en términos de "los más pobres"
Capriles "categorización, su partido ha hecho de la frontera en un tema
electoral, por lo que el gobierno de Guyana no debería ser optimista acerca de
las concesiones por parte de esa dirección. Caricom itself – not to mention Cuba, of course, which according
to a Venezuelan opposition lawmaker has received $28.5B from Venezuela between
2005 and 2011 – will have to confront a serious economic situation.
Caricom sí mismo - por no hablar de Cuba, por supuesto, que de acuerdo a un legislador
de la oposición venezolana ha recibido US $ 28.5B de Venezuela entre 2005 y
2011 - tendrá que enfrentarse a una grave situación económica. There is always the possibility that Mr
Chávez will recover sufficiently to be the presidential candidate in October,
and if that happens, he may have a good chance of winning. Siempre
existe la posibilidad de que el señor Chávez se recuperará lo suficiente como
para ser el candidato a la presidencia en octubre, y si eso sucede, él puede
tener una buena oportunidad de ganar. If
he does, Caricom will no doubt heave a collective sigh of relief since
Venezuelan policy would be unlikely to change – at least in the short term.
Si lo hace, la Caricom, sin duda, un suspiro colectivo de alivio ya que la
política venezolana es poco probable que cambie - al menos en el corto plazo.
If the opposition wins in Caracas, and the result is accepted by the
Chavistas, then while it would be a more difficult situation for this country
in economic terms as well as in terms of boundary considerations, at least
there would be a recognized government in Miraflores with whom we could deal. Si la oposición gana en Caracas, y el resultado es aceptado por los
chavistas, entonces, si bien sería una situación más difícil para este país en
términos económicos como en términos de consideraciones de fronteras, por lo
menos habría un gobierno reconocido en Miraflores con los que podía tratar. Instability next door or some kind of
military configuration, however, would present much greater problems for us,
since one could never be sure what direction these would take, and whether the
border controversy would be seized upon by manipulative elements for nefarious
reasons. Puerta de la inestabilidad que viene o algún tipo de
configuración militar, sin embargo, se presentan problemas mucho más grandes
para nosotros, ya que uno nunca puede estar seguro de qué dirección tomaría
éstos, y si la controversia fronteriza se aprovechada por los elementos de
manipulación por razones infames.
In the meantime one can only hope that Takuba Lodge and the government
as a whole have been doing some contingency planning in terms of policy and
diplomatic strategies, and that our embassy in Caracas is monitoring events in
Venezuela very closely so that credible analyses can be transmitted back to
Georgetown. Mientras tanto sólo nos queda esperar
que Takuba Lodge y el gobierno en su conjunto han estado haciendo un poco de
planificación de contingencia en términos de política y estrategias
diplomáticas, y que nuestra embajada en Caracas está monitoreando los
acontecimientos en Venezuela muy de cerca por lo que los análisis creíbles
pueden ser transmitidos realizar copias de seguridad de Georgetown. The one thing the administration should not
be doing is assuming that the relatively benign relationship we have had with
Venezuela in recent times is necessarily going to continue indefinitely; we
should never be in a position where we are taken by surprise. La única
cosa que la administración no debería estar haciendo es asumir que la relación
relativamente benigno que hemos tenido con Venezuela en los últimos tiempos es
necesariamente va a continuar indefinidamente, nunca debemos estar en una
posición en la que se toman por sorpresa. Finally, this is one clear issue where the government could seek input
from the opposition so any possible positions worked out in relation to
potential scenarios could receive a 'national' imprimatur. Por último,
este es un asunto claro que el gobierno podría solicitar la opinión de la
oposición para todas las posiciones posibles elaborado en relación con los
escenarios potenciales podrían recibir un "nacional" imprimatur.
Article printed from Stabroek News: http://www.stabroeknews.com Artículo original de Stabroek News: http://www.stabroeknews.com
URL to article: http://www.stabroeknews.com/2012/opinion/editorial/05/06/venezuela-2/ URL del artículo:
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2012/opinion/editorial/05/06/venezuela-2/
Venezuela
Posted By Stabroek
staff On May 6, 2012 @ 5:01 am In Editorial | No Comments
Last week the
major Venezuelan newspapers began to cautiously explore political scenarios
which assumed that President Hugo Chávez would not be leading his party
(The United Socialist Party) in the foreseeable future. Venezuelan elections for the
presidency are due on October 7, and while the head of state’s ever increasing
absences from the country have been a cause for concern, prior to this most
commentators (with one major exception) confined themselves to querying the
constitutionality of him not handing over power to the Vice-President in the
interim, and governing from Cuba by “internet,” as his opposition rival
Henrique Capriles dubbed it. That aside, there has been little speculation
about what would happen if Mr Chávez were unable to campaign or were unable to
lead his party into the polls. Of course, it is a tricky subject, because the
full nature of the President’s illness has been kept hidden from the public,
and all spokespersons as well as Mr Chávez himself have vigorously insisted
that he is on the road to recovery.
Recent polls indicated that a
large majority of Venezuelans were indeed convinced he is recuperating from an
undisclosed form of cancer, and that he will lead his party into the general
election. Having
said that, one might have thought that the formerly unshakeable confidence of
at least a few of them might have been undermined by the sight of him at a public
mass in his home state of Barinas on April 30, weeping and asking God for a
“miracle.” However, most seem to have written it off as another example of the
President’s penchant for theatricality. The change in the political firmament
which occurred last week, in contrast, was a development of an altogether
different order which was much harder to dismiss out of hand.
That development was the
establishment of a Council of State, set up under the 1999 constitution, and
chaired by the current Vice-President, Elías Jaua, a sociologist by training
and former student radical. According to El Universal, four of the other five members are
also civilians, namely, José Vicente Rangel, the left-wing journalist and
lawyer who was Minister of Defence for a time in the early part of Chávez’s
period of office, but who left government some years ago; Roy Chaderton, a
senior diplomat and lawyer who at present is the Ambassador to the OAS; Germán
Mundaraín, a lawyer who was the Ombudsman for seven years; and Luis Britto García,
a writer, lawyer, sociologist, university teacher and Chávez loyalist. The
military representative is Admiral Carlos Rafael Giacoppini, who heads the
secretariat of the National Defence Council.
The council has clearly been installed to make
decisions on behalf of President Chávez, and it has already been announced that
its first task is to consider whether Venezuela should withdraw from the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, something which the head of state
had already indicated he wanted done. There is no doubt that particularly this year, there has been
the sense of a power vacuum in Caracas, and in that context there have been
references in the media to in-fighting among the various Chávista factions. It
is in the light of this that El Nuevo Herald has submitted that the
council’s main function is to contain these factional struggles and prevent an
outright confrontation between the various groups.
What several of the
newspapers have now ventured to suggest is that Mr Chávez will not lead his
party into the election and that another candidate will be chosen. While the official line is that there
is no candidate other than Chávez, El Nacional has put forward the possibility
of it being either Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro, Jaua, or Diosdado Cabello,
the President of the National Assembly and a comrade-in-arms of Chávez during
the failed coup of 1992. For its part El Nuevo Herald reported political
analysts as saying Maduro was the most likely candidate, because he would be
“highly competitive at the polls.”
Nelson Bocaranda, a columnist
in El Universal, has been the exception to the generalization made in the first
paragraph, since for some time he has been giving gloomy assessments of the
President’s medical status, which he has attributed to unnamed medical sources.
At a much earlier
stage he had said that Maduro would be identified to lead the party, and he
repeated that again recently. He has also claimed that there have been
discussions in Cuba between the senior military officers concerning the
political future of Venezuela, although the accuracy of what he has said about
those meetings is impossible to gauge. It should perhaps be mentioned that a
few months ago Mr Chávez himself identified Maduro and Cabello as candidates
for governorships in the elections, and if he held to that it would put both of
them out of the running to take over the party.
According to the last
Datanalysis poll, the President is still way ahead of his rival in the run-up
to the election, with a rating of 44% as against 31% for Capriles; 20% of
respondents, the pollster said, were undecided. However, opposition chances would
increase dramatically if Mr Chávez himself was not on the ticket, some earlier
polls indicating that the President’s party could not win without him. In that
kind of a scenario no one knows what could happen. The head of state has never
cultivated a successor – quite the opposite in fact; he has made a point of
moving anyone who could be a competitor or threaten his dominance. As a
consequence, there is no strong figure who could counter centrifugal tendencies
and bring an unstable situation under control. As several commentators have
pointed out, there are all kinds of firearms on the streets, since the policy
was to arm citizen militias, and that in itself is not something conducive to
stability. In addition, no one quite knows what role the military is going to
play. Its officer corps is presumed to be mostly Chávez oriented, since it has
been purged to achieve that end, but it includes elements who have been accused
of criminal activity such as drug-trafficking, and it must be assumed that
these would not want to be exposed to justice and might conceivably move to
protect their interests.
From Guyana’s point of view,
the long and the short of it is that we are in no position to predict with any
accuracy what is going to happen in the nation to our west in the next few
months. Like
several Caribbean territories we have become dependent on Venezuela
economically through the PetroCaribe concession and our rice exports to that
country. We are not as exposed in terms of oil as some countries, since we
receive only 50% of our fuel needs from Venezuela, but should those supplies
dry up for whatever reason, it would still be a body blow. Certainly
Capriles’ foreign policy advisor, Carlos Romero, has been reported as saying
that should his candidate win the election, he would end Venezuela’s
“asymmetrical” economic arrangements, and PetroCaribe which costs $3.2B would
be “re-evaluated.“ Venezuela would, he said, provide subsidized oil to “the
poorest countries, such as Haiti, but there will not be subsidies for countries
like Cuba…“
Even if
Guyana qualified in terms of Capriles’ “poorest” categorization, his party has
made the border an election issue, so the Guyana government should not be
optimistic about any concessions from that direction. Caricom itself – not to mention Cuba,
of course, which according to a Venezuelan opposition lawmaker has received
$28.5B from Venezuela between 2005 and 2011 – will have to confront a serious
economic situation. There is always the possibility that Mr Chávez will recover
sufficiently to be the presidential candidate in October, and if that happens,
he may have a good chance of winning. If he does, Caricom will no doubt heave a
collective sigh of relief since Venezuelan policy would be unlikely to change –
at least in the short term.
If the opposition wins in
Caracas, and the result is accepted by the Chavistas, then while it would be a
more difficult situation for this country in economic terms as well as in terms
of boundary considerations, at least there would be a recognized government in
Miraflores with whom we could deal. Instability next door or some kind of military configuration,
however, would present much greater problems for us, since one could never be
sure what direction these would take, and whether the border controversy would
be seized upon by manipulative elements for nefarious reasons.
In the meantime one can only
hope that Takuba Lodge and the government as a whole have been doing some
contingency planning in terms of policy and diplomatic strategies, and that our
embassy in Caracas is monitoring events in Venezuela very closely so that
credible analyses can be transmitted back to Georgetown. The one thing the administration
should not be doing is assuming that the relatively benign relationship we have
had with Venezuela in recent times is necessarily going to continue
indefinitely; we should never be in a position where we are taken by surprise. Finally,
this is one clear issue where the government could seek input from the
opposition so any possible positions worked out in relation to potential
scenarios could receive a ‘national’ imprimatur.
Article
printed from Stabroek News:
http://www.stabroeknews.com
URL to
article:
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2012/opinion/editorial/05/06/venezuela-2/
1994
Guayana Esequiba - Zona en Reclamación MARNR Servicio Autónomo de
Geografía y Cartografía Nacional 3 Edición
Nota del
editor del blog: Al referenciarse a la República Cooperativa de Guyana se deben
de tener en cuenta los 159.500Km2, de territorios ubicados al oeste del río
Esequibo conocidos con el nombre de Guayana Esequiba o Zona en Reclamación
sujetos al Acuerdo de Ginebra del 17 de febrero de 1966.
Territorios estos sobre los cuales el gobierno
Venezolano en representación de la Nación venezolana se reservo sus derechos
sobre los territorios de la Guayana Esequiba en su nota del 26 de mayo de 1966
al reconocerse al nuevo Estado de Guyana .
“...por lo tanto, Venezuela reconoce como
territorio del nuevo Estado, el que se sitúa al este de la margen derecha del
río Esequibo y reitera ante la comunidad internacional, que se reserva
expresamente sus derechos de soberanía territorial sobre la zona que se
encuentra en la margen izquierda del precitado río; en consecuencia, el territorio
de la Guayana Esequiba sobre el cual Venezuela se reserva expresamente sus
derechos soberanos, limita al Este con el nuevo Estado de Guyana, a través de
la línea del río Esequibo, tomando éste desde su nacimiento hasta su
desembocadura en el Océano Atlántico...”
Mapa que señala el Espacio de Soberanía Marítima Venezolana que se
reserva, como Mar Territorial mediante el Decreto Presidencial No 1152 del 09 de Julio de 1968.
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